Globalisation and ethnic and nationalistic resurgance.

Initially it is necessary to come to some understanding of this phenomenon and the terms used to describe the specific groups and ideas with which we are concerned. Without this clarity the concepts we are employing will make poor tools, because some of these concepts are in essence contested. This notion of contest describes an endless dispute concerning various academic concepts.(1) Therefore our primary task is to reach an understanding of these concepts drawn from the relevant sources by rejecting or modifying those that are problematic and syncretising those that are useful. The examination of empirical data and normative suggestions to guide the confrontation between the global and the national and local must remain, for the most part, beyond the scope of this investigation. However, once we have a conceptual understanding, we should be able to come to some conclusions as to whether globalisation has prompted a resurgence of ethnicity and nationalism.

Globalisation

Globalisation is not a new phenomenon and has been recognised earlier this century before the concept was coined as a phrase and discussed widely. Ortega y Gasset, for example, writes in 1930: "(T)he content of existence for the average man of to-day includes the whole planet... This nearness of the far-off, this presence of the absent, has extended in fabulous proportions the horizon of each individual existence."(2) Other definitions by leading globalisation theorists will be useful in illustrating the complex and contested nature of the concept. Guehenno writes that globalisation is a process of abstraction which has multiple effects on nation-states and their citizens, including amongst others, the distortion of space and boundary erosion.(3) The idea that space is altered and that territorial boundaries are increasingly surpassed by this process is common amongst globalisation theorists, highlighting its importance regarding nation-states. According to Beck globalisation means "among other things, that the walls of distance break down and that strangers and strangeness are increasingly caught in the horizons of one's life."(4) Giddens defines it as the linking of world-wide social relations and local happenings shaped by far away events and vice versa. This does not take place over our heads but within the dialectical and everyday, at the local and personal level.(5) He identifies four determinations which help to clarify this process. The growing interconnectedness of capitalism and the overriding of nation-state power by transnational corporations is the first. Despite this erosion on nation-state power Giddens does emphasise that global relations are still mediated by nation-states as the legitimate representatives of peoples. This interconnectedness of nation-states is the second feature. Following this is the world military order, and finally the international division of labour, expressing the adoption of service industries by the West and the move of heavy industries into the East.(6) Final clarifications of the concept can be reached using Mann’s model for analysis of globalisation, which I will adopt. He distinguishes the local, national, inter-national, transnational and global interaction networks. Global networks are distinguished as virtually universal (e.g. capitalism or patriarchy) or particular and segmented (e.g. feminism). He claims that the enervation of local networks and the converse thickening of the others in structuring society is the clearest form of globalisation.(7) These issues of the local and global and time-space distortion are of primary importance to the concept.

The transnational is an important concept itself, involving some overlap with globalisation, so it needs clarification and can be held in contrast with globalisation to highlight important points. The transnational does not necessarily involve the state (as in the international) and it is highly variable in distribution and scale; this is because the agents involved can be huge national or business enterprises, smaller movements, groups or just individuals.(8) Mann defines the transnational as passing right through or "under" national boundaries e.g. religious sect or race.(9) Here we will explore whether it might be the case that presently, transnational networks are more important than global networks in prompting ethnic and nationalist responses.

Taken as a whole, the above clarifications and Gidden’s determinations suggest the socio-political spheres of identity, culture, the techno-economic, and political institutions, each encompassing a variety of related areas, in which we should examine the influence of globalisation so as to determine whether such influences are prompting ethnic and nationalist responses. The necessity for perspicuous definitions of the two main concepts of ethnicity and nationalism, with which we are concerned regarding globalising effects, requires an initial understanding of the sphere of identity. This is the relatively stable and enduring sense a person has of her/himself (despite all of the associated philosophical problems). Identity is always multiple and fluid, constructed through experience and linguistically coded. In the development of identity culturally available resources and the immediate social network are drawn upon.(10) How this development actually occurs is still debated, and unfortunately how subjects and groups are defined and define themselves can only be briefly noted here. Very simply, elements of identity include biological sex, age, gender, sexuality, class, ethnicity, race, nationality, belief-system and political allegiance.(11) Identity can be taken as the main theme of this investigation, running throughout the other spheres and connecting them at a basic level. With this notion roughly understood, we can turn to the two types in particular with which we are concerned.

Nationalism

Nationalism is the sense of belonging to a group united by common racial, linguistic and historical ties and is usually identified with a particular territory. The corresponding ideology exalts the nation-state as the ideal form of political organisation with an overriding claim on the loyalty of its citizens.(12) This ideology of exaltation and loyalty involves several notions: that national identity ought be accorded recognition, that nations have rights (autonomy, self-determination, sovereignty) and members ought to defend them. The limits of these rights are fixed by the next nation (in this sense individual rights provide a sound analogy). Nationalism is not necessarily aggressive, but it certainly is when it develops into chauvinism. This doctrine demands no limits to national rights except those dictated by national interest. For national chauvinists, national identity is the overriding moral-political consideration (here egoism is analogous).(13) Xenophobia is chauvinism exacerbated by the disliking of individuals or groups thought foreign. This is commonly ethnic in form.(14)

As an ideology of identity, attaching political significance to the history and culture of an nation or people, nationalism is a modern phenomenon (though not without ancient parallels). Citizenship, religious faith, common language and defining historical experience are formative for (or are used by politicians/media to manipulate/exploit) national identity.(15) For the purposes of this essay then, and to avoid further digression into a complex concept, nationalism is to be understood as an ideology of a particular national identity which belongs to a common majority culture within the nation-state. Here one should add the proviso that the above criteria are formative for nationalist forms of national identity. This is because it is necessary to distinguish national identity from nationalism. National identity cannot be found in a single culture, language or history within a nation. "National identity is always a shifting, unsettled complex of historical struggles and experiences that are cross-fertilized, produced, and translated through a variety of cultures. As such it is always open to interpretation and struggle."(16) This is due to the multinational and multicultural dynamic of modern nation-states. In this way identity is to be differentiated from ideologies that sometimes inform it. Most identities are somewhat fluid and changeable, whereas certain ideologies are not.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity is a concept of group association and can refer to a range of communal characteristics: lingual, ancestral, regional, religious, etc forming basis of distinctive identity.(17) In this way it shares some of the categories of identity used to form national identity and solidify other groups, though they may be employed differently. Ethnicity is to be distinguished and compared with other concepts of group association. This form of identity is often rigid, and the reasons for these are various. One reason is that if an ethnic group in a minority, this status usually connotes real, threatened or perceived discrimination and historical disadvantage.(18) In the face of this minority groups protect their interests by defending their identity in demanding conformity from its members and recognition by the majority.

Ethnic groups are also often racial groups or vice versa. Problematically though, many nations define racial groups differently, as do the very groups themselves.(19) The difficulty with race as a concept is because it is a social construct based on a biological fallacy. With different societies defining race in different terms, the concept will never be clear, though the group will be to its members.

Resurgence

With the main concepts outlined, we can understand the notion of resurgence as a reaction against, or even for the process of globalisation. Though the term connotes rebellion, it also suggests rising-up, which may be a form of taking part or taking hold of the process in a manner of acceptance or use.(20) The term resurgence also implies that ethnic and nationalist feeling have been undercurrents in recent history and that globalisation has resulted in their reappearance. However, this may not be the case. Both ethnicity and nationalism appear to be constant historical forces in some form or another which are always in some sort of relationship with other socio-political forces; indeed, they can only be understood in this way. However, an historical overview and analysis as to the waxing and waning of ethnic and nationalist power, or indeed when globalising influences began, are beyond the scope of this essay. To speak in terms of resurgence would be misleading without the proper historical evidence to suggest whether both forces have been quiet and inactive prior to globalising effects or not. Despite this, our analysis of the spheres outlined above should give us some understanding as to whether or not ethnic and nationalist groups have reacted, and how they have reacted, to globalisation.

Culture

Most theorists understand Western culture as the primary globalising culture. To understand its influence one would have to characterise Western culture, but to do so would be as contentious as it would be lengthy.(21) Our understanding of Western culture thus necessitates a more abstract and less particular definition of the concept culture. The conceptual endeavour is difficult alone. The conceptual difficulty is due to the complexity of "culture" as a word. This is partly due to its long, intricate history and partly due to its part as a central concept in several distinct and incompatible intellectual disciplines.(22) A thorough examination of the concept culture is beyond the scope of this essay, so perhaps Kymlicka’s definition of societal culture will be sufficient for our present purposes. Societal culture provides members with a meaningful public and private life within the territorially and linguistically concentrated social, educational, religious, recreational and economic spheres. His definition is linked to the effects of modernization. That is: the development of society-wide institutions, the standardisation of language and the end of medieval class stratification.(23) This link to modernization allows us to point to a definite characteristic of Western culture as modernized. Other than this specific point, Kymlicka’s understanding of culture could be applied to any culture.

This definition of culture will allow us to come to a clear conceptual understanding of ethnicity and nationalism by contrasting them to culture, and specifically, the culture of the globally influential West. Clearly then, ethnicities have their own cultures, though there maybe overlap with the cultures of other groups. Nationalism is somewhat different in that it is typically concerned with a majority culture bounded within the nation-state. However, the effects of globalisation on these cultures are as multiple as cultures themselves.

These effects are mainly analysed in terms of the local and the global. This serves to emphasize the multiple forms in which culture and identity are found in comparison to the widespread influences of Western culture. Some theorists have postulated that these global influences will result in global homogeniety, but this does not appear to be likely. Wallace points out that globalising forces tend to become indigenized through process of assimilation and alteration.(24) Furthermore, the very complexity of a single culture and its subcultural groups make it seem highly implausible that there is even such a thing as a homogenous culture today, never mind one which is becoming globally omnipresent. These issues are examined more thoroughly in the techno-economic discussion below, because the expansion of Western culture is deeply entwined with telecommunications.(25)

Techno-economic

Telecommunication is the primary area within this sphere in which we have space to analyse, though there are many other areas like military weapons, capitalist institutions and finance, medicine, trade, transport and the expansion of technology and modernisation. Technological innovation in communications appears to be the initial reason why globalisation was famously discussed in the sixties by McLuhan with regards to television, who also coined the misleading phrase "global village". Increased interest in the concept occurred in the eighties concurrent with the popularisation of the satellite television and Internet.

The Internet is unlike television in that its users are much more restricted globally, despite its claims of being a "world-wide web". Figures show that the Internet is much more of a west-wide web. In 1999 "(a)lmost 99 percent of all internet connections were in North America, Western Europe and Japan, with 1 percent being shared among the 4 billion people who made up the rest of the world's population."(26) Using Mann's terms, the Internet ought perhaps be characterised as a transnational network rather than a global one, as it is evidently by no means globally universal or even segmented and particular. Though there are other users world-wide, the legal ambiguities and ease of access to other parts of the world express the transnational character of boundary hopping, rather than global character of pervasiveness. However, because the Internet does allow distant events to effect us as readily and accessibly as TV (perhaps even more so due to the speed of updates), as well as involving Harvey's notion of "time-space compression," it does have some of the characteristics of globalisation. Despite its controversial status as a globalising influence it has still resulted in ethnic and nationalist responses. These can be found in the form of web-sites advocating ethnic and nationalist causes even in countries as poorly connected as Africa. (e.g. Africa online at http://www.africaonline.com). As a result the Internet is becoming a show-case or a cyber-space for all kinds of interest (most of which can be found with any good search engine), which also allows almost instant communications and interaction between ethnic and nationalist groups, which maybe separated by time and territorial boundaries, via e-mail, newsgroups, mailing lists, voice-mail, web-cams, IRC and ICQ and web-sites.

Telecommunications, especially television and satellite television, have been understood by some as encouraging a global culture.(27) Smith examines the claims of postmodernists like Richmond regarding this supposedly emergent global culture. The postmodernists claim that because telecommunications transcends state boundaries, culture becomes unbounded and can only be understood as continental or global. This allows "denser, more intense interaction between members of communities" and the "re-emergence of submerged ethnic communities and their nationalisms." Telecommunications will keep eroding cultural boundaries and result in a global culture.(28) Smith doubts the conclusions of these arguments though, for a variety of reasons. The main objection regards the artificiality of a media constructed culture, which operates outside the strict cultural constraints of expression, particularity and temporality. This new culture would have to evoke popular responses by "hewing close to vernacular motifs and styles." But its images must uniformly move and inspire world populations via the telecommunications networks. Problematically, different people react to images and symbols in different ways according to their cultural background, resulting in the indiginization Wallace is concerned with. These reactions appear to involve the practice of incoporation where elements of an opposing culture are absorbed, depriving them of any force.(29) This is because cultural identities form over long historical periods of common experience involving continuity, shared memories and common destiny.(30) Huntington writes in support of this: "people interpret communications in terms of their own preexisting values and perspectives." Huntington speculates that this may lead to regional media networks, which is significant with regard to examining ethnic and nationalist responses.(31) In this way the influence of telecommunications provokes ethnic and national differentiation or homogenisation, depending on the particular group interpretations grounded in its historical identity.

Thus a global collective identity would prove to be confused, fragmentary and ephemeral. This is not to reject the notion that culture is unbounded by territory however, as telecommunications are clearly a transnational force.

Political Institutions

The nation-state is the primary political institution with which we must concern ourselves with here, because the effects of globalisation on it are most controversial and it is the locus of nationalist feeling.(32) Mann identifies the threat caused by globalisation to the nation-state, and thus nationalism, as the notion that "those concerned with the ‘new politics’ of identity - gender, sexuality, lifestyle, age cohort, religion and ethnicity - weaken national (and nationally regulated class) identities, replacing or supplementing them...". But he considers this threat minimal as states are now asked to legislate and enforce moral conduct. Because authoritative social regulation remains largely with the nation-state, this may reinvigorate its political scope and nationalist enterprise. However this does result in constant and controversial political debate and legislation. This is known as "culture war" between the noted identities and could paradoxically weaken the nation-state because it involves transnational and particular global networks.(33) Wallace seems to consider "culture war" as less dangerous than this, regarding the heterogeneity of nations as consolidations of many different ethnic and national groups which grow stronger for it, rather than weaker. This is because despite heterogeneity, nations attempt to whitewash and gloss diversity in pursuit of a common identity and an ultimate aim. In this way nations bleed loyalty and power from the smaller groups that make it up, though they sometimes denying the existence of, or attempting to destroy, these groups instead. In their turn ethnic and other minority groups make claims to overarching ends when they aspire to nationhood.(34) In support, Smith understands nations to be formed by "vernacular mobilization" and "cultural politicisation" of ethnic groups when they aspire in this fashion. This is the mobilization, identity formation and destiny orientation of a stateless ethnic community, by a strong intelligentsia, who are threatened with dissolution, possibly in the form of globalisation.

Political rhetoric makes this move from the particular to the universal clear. For example "The British People" obscures all difference. This also occurs in a crisis, for example, "The Battle for Britain" and to a lesser extent in other discourse like sport, advertising (e.g. "Buy British Beef") and humour.(35) But today’s nation continues to survive for other reasons too. Competition for adherents and prestige, born from ethnic nationalism, causes "culture wars" between nations, as well as within them, expressing the division of "our world into discrete blocks, which show little sign no harmonization, let alone amalgamation."(36) This reading of Mann, Wallace and Smith reassures us that the nation-state is doing well, and may do better, because of its minority groups and despite (or because of) immigration and the other possibilities associated with globalisation. Indeed, they emphasise the existence of strong nationalist and ethnic sentiments among nations, which is expressed in the national and transnational "culture wars" and in the civil and international military conflicts between nations and ethnicities around the world today. In fact, Mann’s two counter-thesis illustrate that nation-states prompt more nationalist and ethnic responses than globalisation.(37) However, an alternative account of the nation-state heralds its death, or at least its moribund condition, hastened directly by globalisation.

Guehenno writes "the gulf between the nation as a locus of identity and the nation as locus of power is formidable."(38) This thesis is supported by the failure of resurgent national ambitions to strengthen the nation-state.(39) This gulf and subsequent failure are primarily due to the abstraction of space and the breakdown of territorial boundaries caused by the multitude of transnational and global networks (mainly travel and telecommunications as noted above). Because space is less important, so too is the solidarity associated with it. This heralds the ends of the nation and the rise of said networks.(40) Social atomization increases with these network growths, as ethnic and other groups cohere transnationally, and territorial solidarity decreases inversely because of the resulting decline of national collective memory and commonality.(41) Nationalism is the reaction against globalisation and transnationality and their exacerbation of national dissolutions in territory and identity, for want of a better option to secure democracy.(42)

Though Guehenno’s writing is exciting, it may be somewhat prone to exaggeration. As we have seen, telecommunications and travel are important, but have not yet the global scope to result in the kind of breakdown of the nation-state Guehenno portrays due to their almost exclusive accessibility to rich Westerners and to the idiosyncratic reactions of varied cultures to Western culture. However, Guehenno’s emphasis on social atomization is important, and it is not clear whether the "culture wars" between the new social movements will strengthen the nation-state as Mann considers, or lead to its dissolution as a common project. Indeed, it is clear that most of the cited theorists (including Mann) accept the enervation of the local and the rise of the other networks, especially the transnational. If this is the case, further ethnic and nationalist reactions will certainly occur with greater vigour than ever before. Ethnic groups may well be in a local minority, but this will matter less than their transnational unity. And if the national is to suffer as much as the local, nationalist groups may have one last explosion of panicked and preservationist feeling before lying down to die along side the nation-state they adhere to. But this remains to be seen.

Conclusion

What conclusions can be drawn from the varied and contentious reactions noted within the limited field of debate examined here? The identification of trends in the development of globalisation born from these reactions may illuminate its actual influence. Globalising processes are definitely a part of the average Westerners consciousness, and for the rich in other countries, and will continue to be. Certainly, particular global transformations in the compression of time and space are occurring in telecommunications experiences, and the average Westerner is more aware of the global effects and causes of pollution, climate change and military weapons. However there is some conceptual and actual overlap between globalising networks and transnational networks. Global processes are often transnational in character also and it is unclear which is the most influential. It is certainly the case that the local is becoming less important as a source of identity and interaction with the converse growth of the other networks. The atomisation of society and the strengthening of transnational interaction networks support this; perhaps we are witnessing the transformation of majorities into a collection of minorities. However, identity appears to be initially informed by "us and them" binary oppositions like: black and white, left and right, masculine and feminine, young and old, "gay" and "straight", good and evil, sane and insane, healthy and ill, law-abiding and criminal, normal and abnormal.(43) It is also informed by negative definitions, that is: defining oneself by what one is not.(44) So despite atomization and transnationality, there is evidently a strong case for exclusive and oppositional identities located within territorial or ideological camps which will react to what is perceived as an encroachment by "others"; despite Gidden’s insistence that there are no others.

These reactions are evident when we consider the forms of globalisation taking place within the four spheres examined. There are the varied ethnic and nationalist reactions to the global implications of modern warfare throughout the world dependant on geo-political situation and destructive capability. There is the dissemination of culture by the West via the telecommunications networks resulting in the complex process of indigenization and incorporation of culture, guided by historically developed identities. However, it is still unclear as to whether globalisation is a new and insidious form of Western cultural imperialism which dominates other cultures, or whether the significance of Western cultural products is formulated on the basis of local knowledge and feelings. Underpinning these trends and counter-trends are the "culture wars" taking place on all network levels, and the high value placed on self-determination. The development of these trends will in turn determine the fate of the nation-state and the extent globalisation will prompt further ethnic and nationalist reactions.

But globalisation may not be as important as it seems because its effects are invariably particular, transnational or confined to the West and the rich. There are other reasons as to why ethnicities and nationalisms have reacted. One example of non-global influences on reactions is Giroux’s consideration of the new nationalism in America to be caused by the current conservative defence of the "American way of life" and subsequent backlash against minorities.(44) These minorities are not all immigrants who are part of the globalising process; many have been there for centuries. In this way, national and local concerns rather than global ones have caused the nationalist reaction. Following this, ethnic minorities react in turn. Another non-globalising force is the nation-state, which may presently be a greater influence than globalisation, competing for power and prompting nationalist reactions against its perceived dissolution, as Mann and Gehenno claim respectively. Also, these reactions may be explained psychologically as opposed to simply being reactionary responses to globalisation. Perhaps the most important psychological explanation is the apparent need for common culture, solidarity and thus the sense of common identity. With this in place people make sacrifices for each other, as commonality seems to be a requirement for equality of opportunity.(45)

It also seems to be the case that universal globalisation is only possible in some respects but not present in actuality, and will not be for a long time. Though telecommunications provide the framework for a global culture they have no historical core by which to direct identity.(46) Though there are Western tendencies towards international government and economics (like the European Union) which may foreshadow a global framework, the present is really characterised by trilateral, rather than global, economic relations, retaining a geo-economic order concentrated in and dominated by Europe, N. America and East Asia where the nation-states are the most successful.(47) All of these issues show that the influence of globalisation in prompting group reactions can be minimal.

Finally, we must note a short analysis of reactions caused by religious issues. These are important because they too are forms of identity related to nationalism and ethnicity and the fate of the nation-state. Huntington writes that with regards to religion, the rise of fundamentalist movements and the general resurgence of religion in the twentieth century have bolstered religious differences.(48) For Guehenno religion is indeterminacy "revered as the last refuge of meaning." Religions do not attempt to be neither believable, rational, modern nor universal, thus increasingly their allure.(49) In this way religious groups helps to limit the anonymous, groundless and numbing universalism of the "limitless standardisation of networks" by defining the boundaries of solidarity (an "us" and "them" identity of opposition), lending people a centre by which to orientate(50) because the political order is not capable of establishing values.(51) As such it is a reaction against this decentering and devaluing process of globalisation. According to Guehenno this is because people exist only via the connections they can make, so the resulting reaction is the assertion of uniqueness by certain groups, to give themselves added protection and value as irreplaceable.(52) Here Guehenno may have isolated the primary prompt for all groups in reacting to globalisation. That is: the fear of transience, meaninglessness and mortality, where people have come to realise that the world is not a global village, but a very big and dangerous place where no matter what happens, they will not be missed.

  • (1) Connolly - The Terms of Political Discourse
  • (2) Ortega - The Revolt of the Masses, p29
  • (3) Guehenno - The End of the Nation-State, p7-9
  • (4) Beck - Democracy Without Enemies, p133-134
  • (5) Dodd - Social Theory and Modernity, p192
  • (6) McGuigan - Culture and the Public Sphere, p97
  • (7) Mann - Has globalisation ended the rise and rise of the nation-state?, p474-475
  • (8) Hannerz - Transnational Connections, p6
  • (9) Mann - Has globalisation ended the rise and rise of the nation-state?, p474
  • (10) Bullock and Trombley (eds.) - The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, p413
  • (11) Wallace notes on pages 156 and 169 of The Future of Race, Ethnicity and Nationalism that all of these identity elements except political allegiance are ascribed characteristics, meaning that they are usually fixed for life after being imposed at birth via socialisation, rites of passage and medical and administrative categorisation. Only some can instead be achieved, meaning that they are gained through competition or effort (e.g. class mobilisation or "coming out" as a homosexual). Thankfully, there are also techniques used for passing, meaning that ascribed characteristics can be changed (e.g. name changing and adoption, transexual operations, transgender lifestyles, religious or political conversion or abstention, emmigration). This is a clear illustration that identity is a complex field of study where changes, ambiguity and conflict are not uncommon. To what degree this is influenced by globalisation can only be touched upon in this study.
  • (12) Bullock and Trombley (eds.) - The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, p561-562
  • (13) Honderich - The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, p603
  • (14) Bullock and Trombley (eds.) - The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, p928
  • (15) Honderich - The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, p603
  • (16) Giroux - Fugitive Cultures: Race, Violence and Youth, p198
  • (17) Bullock and Trombley (eds.) - The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, p285
  • (18) Bullock and Trombley (eds.) - The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, p533. Kymlicka conceptualises minority cultures other than ethnic and national minorities as new social movements. These are sexualities other than heterosexual, women, the poor and the disabled. (Kymlicka - Multicultural Citizenship p19). These groups are marginalized within their own cultures and groups, sometimes forming minorities within minorities.
  • (19) See Joppke citation of Nazli Kibria’s observation of "pan-Asian American identity... centred not on political victimization, but on cultural communalities. In this identity the lines between ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are blurred." How Immigration is Changing Citizenship, p635 (from Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 22 number 4 July 1999).
  • (20) For example, Huntington examines reactions to the modern culture of the West in terms of rejection, acceptance or reform, and an assessment of the success of these reactions in The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order.
  • (21) This is reflected in the current debate regarding Britishness, never mind the entire West. A good range of opinion can be found on http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid_966000/966629.stm under Wednesday, 11 October 2000 - What is Britishness?
  • (22) Williams - Keywords, p76-77
  • (23) Kymlicka - Multicultural Citizenship p76-77
  • (24) Wallace - The Future of Race, Ethnicity and Nationalism, p139-40
  • (25) Hannerz writes in support of this in Transnational Connections, p22: "To grasp the nature of the culture we live with now, we must also take an interest in the management of meaning by corporate and institutional actors, not least by the state and in the market place."
  • (26) Slevin - The Internet and Society, p40
  • (27) Williams writes authoritatively on the issue of Western culture penetrating other cultures via telecommunications in Television – technology and cultural form p42. "In the developing world old (Western) films and television programmes are in effect dumped, at prices which make any local production seem ludicrously expensive by comparison. A market is then created in which available entertainment, advertising and general political and cultural influence come in a single ‘cheap’ package." (parenthesis mine).
  • (28) Smith -Toward a Global Culture?, p174-175
  • (29) Fiske - Introduction to Communication Studies, p181
  • (30) Smith -Toward a Global Culture?, p178-9.
  • (31) Huntington - The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, p59 See also T. Liebes and E. Katz - The Export of Meaning: Cross-Cultural Readings of Dallas (Oxford University Press 1990). Furthermore, one could also site a linguistic analogy. Artificial languages like Idiom Neutral, Novial, Ido, Interlingua, Interglossa, Ro, Occidental, Monling and Esperanto have all failed to be adopted and spoken due to their artificiality and lack of historical use. (see J. Campbell - Grammatical Man, Pelican 1984).
  • (32) Mann defines the nation-state as a collection of institutions claiming formal political sovereignty over "its" territories and a legitimacy based on the "people" or "nation" inhabiting them – Has globalisation ended the rise and rise of the nation-state?, p476
  • (33) Mann – Has globalisation ended the rise and rise of the nation-state?, 491-492
  • (34) Wallace – The Future of Race, Ethnicity and Nationalism, p2-3
  • (35) Bassnett - Studying British Culture, pxx. One can see the absurdity, indeed vileness, of political rhetoric in, for example, William Hague’s definition of the British People as: "ambitious, sporty, fashion-conscious, brassy, self-confident… the Britain which watches MTV and Changing Rooms, and which is fascinated by Ricky and Bianca's ups and downs". See http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid_966000/966849.stm
  • (36) Smith – Toward a Global Culture? p183-5
  • (37) Mann - Has globalisation ended the rise and rise of the nation-state?
  • (38) Guehenno - The End of the Nation-State, p138. Guehenno appears to use the terms "nation" and "nation-state" synonymously, defining the nation as "defin(ing) itself by what it is not: not a social, racial, religious group. A nation is historical, the locus of common history, memory and destiny." p4
  • (39) Guehenno - The End of the Nation-State, p131
  • (40) Guehenno - The End of the Nation-State, p17
  • (41) Guehenno - The End of the Nation-State, p30
  • (42) Guehenno - The End of the Nation-State, p50
  • (43) This dualistic oppositions roughly correspond to the identities of race, political wing, gender, age, sexuality, religion, psychology, health, legal-status and social status in general. The examination of most of these identities in these terms has been the work of Michel Foucault.
  • (44) Huntington supports this in The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, p67. "It is possible these differences endure because of the way people define themselves, that is: in terms of what they are not." Guehenno backs this claim in The End of the Nation-State p4 with "(a) nation defines itself by what it is not..."
  • (45) Giroux – Fugitive Cultures: Race, Violence and Youth, p190
  • (46) Smith Toward a Global Culture?, p186-187
  • (47) Smith -Toward a Global Culture?, p180 and p188. Whether this historical core is necessary or not is controversial; for example, the Frankfurt School’s "culture industry" was not a historical culture, but one that was supported by a capitalist media. Also, Smith does make concessions to transnational culture, writing about "overlapping and boundary transcending cultural and political motifs and traditions" on p187.
  • (48) Mann - Has globalisation ended the rise and rise of the nation-state?, p479-480
  • (49) Huntington - The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, p64
  • (50) Guehenno - The End of the Nation-State, p92-93
  • (51) Guehenno - The End of the Nation-State, p96-98
  • (52) Guehenno - The End of the Nation-State, p127
  • (53) Guehenno - The End of the Nation-State, p86

    • Bibliography

    Bassnett, S - Studying British Culture (Routledge 1997)

    Beck, U - Democracy Without Enemies (Polity Press 1998)

    Connolly, W - The Terms of Political Discourse (Princeton University Press)

    Dodd, N - Social Theory and Modernity (Polity Press 1999)

    Fiske, J - Introduction to Communication Studies (Routledge 1990)

    Giroux, H. A - Fugitive Cultures: Race, Violence and Youth (Routledge 1996)

    Guehenno, J-M - The End of the Nation-State (University of Minnesota Press 1995)

    Hannerz, U - Transnational Connections (Routledge 1996)

    Honderich, T - The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford University Press 1995)

    Huntington, S. P - The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon and schuster 1996)

    Kymlicka, W - Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford University Press 1995)

    McGuigan, J - Culture and the Public Sphere (Routledge 1996)

    Mann, M - Has globalisation ended the rise and rise of the nation-state? (Routledge 1997)

    Ortega Y Gasset, J - The Revolt of the Masses (Unwin Books 1963)

    Slevin, J - The Internet and Society (Polity Press 2000)

    Smith, A. D -Toward a Global Culture? (from Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 7 1990)

    Bullock, A and Trombley, S (eds.) - The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (HarperCollins 1999)

    Wallace, W. L - The Future of Race, Ethnicity and Nationalism (Praeger Publications 1997)

    Williams, R – Television: technology and cultural form (Routledge 1990)

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