"Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant). How effective is this principle for identifying our moral obligations?

Kant’s moral principle, the categorical imperative, is not effective for identifying our moral obligations on a practical level, but has some use for philosophical speculation in the realms of meta- ethics. So why is Kant’s moral principle not practical? Within the confines of this short essay I will attempt to show that Kant’s moral philosophy is underdeveloped, "certain claims are left so vague that one suspects him of using them as devices to get the concrete moral results he wants" (Walker, "Kant" p151). The two main objections to Kant’s moral philosophy that one could raise are that first, his moral philosophy is too abstract and therefore inapplicable to everyday moral situations, and second, his moral philosophy rests on assumptions concerning human nature.

Abstraction

What Kant tells us about the categorical imperative and about its applications in real, everyday life, is not satisfactory or adequately worked out. His most valuable contributions are at the most abstract level. Kant wanted "a pure foundational moral philosophy... completely free from everything which may be only empirical and thus is the ethics of purely rational beings." ("The Great Philosophers - Kant, selections" edited by Lewis White Beck p237- my emphasis). But, we are not purely rational are we? Though Kant’s purely rational moral philosophy maybe convincing to some degree, he is open to the charge that it is useless. After all, how would we use this moral philosophy? Kant tries to support it with his distinction between the Phenomenal and Numenal Realm, but this sounds like a philosophical fairy story, it is rather Platonic in some ways and totally abstract. Kant places so much emphasis on rationality, but is his distinction of realms rational? If not then rationality becomes far less important. And if this is so, the categorical imperative suffers. "...The principles are not derived from human nature. This may seem to some to be rather far-fetched...." ("The Great Philosophers - Kant, selections" edited by Lewis White Beck p237- my emphasis). For Kant, experience is not a guide to morality - and this is the failing point, he falls at the first stumbling block, because it is experience that guides our actions, not speculative abstract realms.

Why does Kant place much emphasis on reason? Kierkegaard and Rousseau have an ambivalent attitude to reason, and their moral philosophy was able to avoid this problem of abstract reason. People are not robots. Kant is too cold and cerebral. He needs more emphasis on emotion and experience. Why is reason paramount? Of course, philosophy is a reasonable a priori exercise, but do we need to be so objective and abstract, especially ethically? I do not believe so because none of our moral philosophies could be pragmatic otherwise - and I think it is telling that none of them are (if this were not so we would be living in a utopia would we not?). After all, what better is there to guide human actions than experience of the human situation? Still, it is interesting to note that even though the Kingdom of Ends is too abstract it "..gives us another imaginative test to which we can submit maxim: would this be the sort of principle one could act on in a morally perfect community?" (Walker "Kant" p159).

The Limits of Reason

Kant believed in God and was pessimistic about how much reason can establish. He thought that the existence of God, freedom and cause and effect cannot be proven philosophically or scientifically. Kant did not believe in definitive conclusions and explained these things with transcendentals which are imposed upon our reality to give us God, morality and science. Despite admitting to these problems (and trying to solve them with some dubious metaphysics) Kant still places major emphasis on reason. If Kant had considered the limits of reason a little more, he would have realised that such a rationalistic approach as the Categorical Imperative is problematic to say the least.

Kierkegaard once said that reason has nothing to do with faith. The leap of faith that is required by religious believers takes one beyond reason; that this is absurd is the leaps main requirement. If one is to believe what Kierkegaard has to say, then Kant has a problem. As a religious believer how can he place so much emphasis on reason when it is a requirement of his faith that he accepts paradoxes like the Incarnation and the story of Abraham and Isaac? Kant seems to subordinate his faith to reason, indeed he binds God by reason, by the Categorical Imperative. How does Kant expect the moral philosopher, or indeed theologian to accept such an oversight? As a theist, Kant has to square his moral philosophy with his religion (or reject his religion, and thereby God resulting in further problems with regards to abstraction and the Categorical Imperative) or he is open to the charge of abstraction again.

Human nature

"Quite apart from the value of such assertions as "there exists a categorical imperative" one can still ask: what does such an assertion say of the man who asserts it?" (F. Nietzsche "Beyond Good and Evil" p110 - my emphasis). Kant makes vast assumptions concerning human nature. Apart from the charge that he has grossly miscalculated the importance of reason in human affairs, he does not prove that every human would rationally agree on the categorical imperative, or respect it. His idea that people should be treated as ends and not as means is an noble one, but flawed because Kant has not thoroughly investigated human nature. Perhaps the categorical imperative says more about him than general human nature. "But why, he exhorted himself, should one therefore abandon the instincts! One must help both them and reason to receive their due - one must follow the instincts, but persuade reason to aid them with good arguments." (F. Nietzsche "Beyond Good and Evil" p114).

What does Kant mean by calling people ends? "He does not say enough about this, though; there will be situations in which whatever we do one person’s interest must be subordinated to anothers, and he does not tell us how to handle these. More generally it might be objected that a respect for human worth need not necessarily involve a concern for happiness." (Walker "Kant" p156) e.g. for the ascetic and the sadist this does not matter. So, Kant talks about humans not treating each other as ends (whatever that means), but don’t people always treat each other as ends? Don’t we all use each other to achieve what we want? Or even to achieve the categorical imperative if we were Kantians? Though it is worthwhile to note that Kant is actually talking about the distinction between exploitation and mutual co-operation, isn’t the satisfaction in co-operation self-centred? This question, like the others, is purely rhetorical. Though we are encouraged to avoid such questions in essays, I find it useful to do this here, as it illustrates my point - what human nature really is, goes unanswered by Kant (and everyone else for that matter). If humans were egoists (and Kant gives me no good reason to believe otherwise) then it is impossible for us to avoid using others as means; even if it appears otherwise. Is not someone always being exploited, or taking more and giving less?. In our capitalist society, there is always a loser. In parent/child relationships parents give more to their children than they receive. A Kantian ends/means balance on this world-wide human scale is impossible. I doubt if it would be possible even in a tiny community - because humans are unequal and finite and cannot see the grand scheme of ends/means balance (if there is one).

Kant’s rationality collapses under the weight of human motives and emotions, under the weight of human nature. If people do things it is because they want to. They are not doing it because of the categorical. imperative "...in short, moralities too are only a sign language of the emotions." (F. Nietzsche "Beyond Good and Evil" p110). So is man totally selfish and are his moralities emotivist? What does this mean for the categorical. imperative is this is so? It means there can be no duty. Kant makes assumptions concerning human nature and uses his fairy story of realms to back them.

Also, Kant undervalues the importance of happiness in human affairs. Though he sees happiness as valuable, unless a goodwill is involved, Kant considers happiness to be worthless. But this is not true, even if happiness does not fit Kant’s definition of "goodness" (i.e. a "goodwill") we do not think our happiness to be worthless.

Finally, "From the fact that the moral imperative must be categorical Kant argues that it must also be universal in form. Because we must obey the law for its own sake and not for any external inducement....." (Walker, "Kant" p153). But what of heaven/hell then? After all, Kant believed in God, and if there is not any external inducement, than why should one obey the law for it’s own sake? Moral theory should tell us what we ought to do, and give good reason for it based on human experience, not inhuman abstraction. Also it is not clear what Kant means by universal. he says the law is not different for different people. So: "In the sense he intends, a universal principle cannot make exceptions in favour of particular individuals, or give a special status to them." (Walker, "Kant" p153). But what of hierarchies? what of King and country? what of duty to one person over another? The categorical imperative cannot cope if we only want some people to do one thing and others to do another. This is because of the universality principle - which is impractical!

Practically, morality requires us to treat different people differently. Even though Kant’s principle is meant to be universal and involve equality of respect it does in fact allow arbitrary discrimination, "‘always treat black people like animals’ contains no singular terms, and someone - a ‘fanatic’ - might accept that if he were black he should be treated a an animal too. (And he would be happy with a state of affairs in which everyone treated black people so.)." (Walker "Kant" p155). So, not only is this equality of respect practically unworkable and the notion imprecise, the categorical imperative is open to a certain amount of "abuse". "Even if he could clarify it he would still only have given a necessary condition that moral principles must satisfy. Principles can meet the requirement of equality of respect without being morally right. "Always make everyone as miserable as possible" is universal....." (Walker "Kant" p155). This shows that Kant does not provide an adequate test for discerning moral actions as right or wrong. Now this is what a moral theory is meant to do!

"No real explanation is offered of what rational beings must necessarily will, or why they must and it is not enough to talk of furthering my own perfection and the happiness of others, without making clear in what these ends consist, or how to reconcile the cases where ends conflict. Nor can we say that Kant is entirely free from confusion on what his formal requirement of universality involves. We saw that his actual arguments shows only that the moral law binds all rational beings, not that it must be free of reference to particulars or call for equality of respect." (Walker "Kant" p156). One can see this if we break down Kant’s moral theory into this schematic:

PURE REASON - a priori - command - universal law PRACTICAL REASON - empirical - counsel - specific & hypothetical, pragmatic imperative.

it is practical reason that is the only part of Kant’s theory that we can possibly practically use, due to the problems discussed above. Kant once said "what is worthy of respect in me is that I know how to obey - and things ought to be no different with you!" And obey Kant must, but it is not in obedience to the universal law, but to practical reason that one ought to obey. "‘Thou shalt obey someone and for a long time: otherwise thou shalt perish and lose all respect for thyself’ - this seems to me to be nature’s imperative, which is, to be sure, neither "categorical" as old Kant demanded it should be (hence the "otherwise" -), nor addressed to the individual (what do individuals matter to nature!)...." (F. Nietzsche "Beyond Good and Evil" p112) here Nietzsche is making the point that such a morality as Kant’s is "life denying", is narrows horizons, one cannot possibly live by it (and it is hypothetical - this is seen in the otherwise - not categorical), and if one were to, it would require overwhelming sacrifice.

Bibliography

Beck, L. W., (ed.), "The Great Philosophers - Kant, selections" (Scribner/Macmillan Book 1988)

Cassirer. E., "Kant’s Life and Thought" (Yale University 1981)

Nietzsche, F., "Beyond Good and Evil" (Penguin Classics - 1990)

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