What are the relative merits and demerits of Locke’s account versus Leibniz’s account of the notion of human freedom?

Leibniz

"Man’s freedom, which consists in his spontaneity, or the logical principle that all his modifications follow from the law of his own essential nature, or that his predicates are included in his essential subject, is freedom from external mechanical contingency only but not from logical determination or from self-compulsion... We are free only because the events which constitute our individuality flow from the law of our nature, but both are rooted in the perfect logical necessity of God’s plan... our individual law through the principle of the best possible and our particular perceptions through the functional relations by which they represent the universe." ("Leibniz - Philosophical papers and letters" ed. Leroy E. Loemker).

Each of us has a monad associated with our being. These are determined by the pre-established harmony of all possible worlds as set down by God. The chronological exfoliation of the monadic programmes are already decided. So, if our monads are determined, then surely we are also? Leibniz’s claims that we are not determined causally because there is no causation (monads have no windows). So are we determined metaphysically then? No created substance really acts on any other because God has pre-established a harmony between the states of all created substances, such that it is in principle possible to infer from any state of any one substance to a corresponding state of any other substance (see the analogy of the clocks with regards to pre-established harmony). An omniscient being, such as God, can tell in advance all that a substance will do; indeed, it is just because, for example, Adam will choose to eat the apple that God decides to create the Adam that he does create. Despite this Leibniz insists that humans have freewill and uses Jesuitical tactics to marginalise and get rid of, as opposed to solve, this problem of freedom.

Leibniz’s concept of hypothetical necessity provides him with answers to problems about human freedom. He wanted to maintain that the will is free; yet pre-established harmony contradicts freedom in two ways. First, if each substance has a complete concept that covers all that it does then how can a human be free? Second, the principle of individuation means that nothing is accidental and the principle of sufficient reason means that every human action is explicable. But if to explain something is to show it as following necessary laws, then how can a human do other than what he does? Leibniz replies that the existence of, say, an Adam who will eat the apple is not logically necessary; it is only hypothetically necessary, given that God wills to create the best possible world, and an Adam of such a kind is an indispensable part of such a world. As to the necessary laws that determine the acts of a human, Leibniz would say that it is indeed true that we must follow the strongest motive. But motives "incline without necessitating", by which Leibniz means that what we do is only hypothetically necessary, and that it is always logically possible for us to choose something other than what we in fact choose.

To understand this, we have to understand Leibniz’s concept of hypothetical necessity. Hypothetical necessity is to say that something is necessary given that such and such is the case-namely, that there is a creative deity that makes such and such decisions. There are some necessities that are absolute, e.g. A = A. The predicate is always contained in the subject. Other necessities are hypothetical, e.g. If I were a tiger, then I’d be a carnivore ("If"... "then"...). Leibniz uses the example of Judas to illustrate. If Judas did not betray Jesus, then he would not be Judas.

Locke

Locke was part of the initial rejection of the mechanics of Aristotelian essentialism. That is that Aristotelian does not apply to "things" but to the names we give "things" - definitions are not "things" but names of "things". Expression must not be confused with nature. For Locke, freedom and freewill are distinguished in a clear cut way, and that freewill is always a unitary idea, it cannot be diminished or augmented; freedom however, can be. Integral to Locke’s account of freedom is his thought concerning the will (volition) itself and in what ways can we talk about the will and freedom. Locke’s account of freedom of the will first of all begins with aiming to deflate "...the whole question as resting upon grammatical confusions." (Lowe. E. J., "On Human Understanding"). Freedom for Locke is whether an agent wills or does not will an action. Locke claims that freedom is a ‘power’ that agents use whenever they will or forbear and that to talk about freedom of the will is to talk absurdly about freewill "...the will is nothing except one power or ability, and freedom another power or ability, so that to ask whether the will has freedom is to ask whether one power has another power, one ability has another ability: a question at first sight too grossly absurd to make a dispute, or need an answer." ("An Essay Concerning Human Understanding" p.16, J. Locke). Recalling what Locke has said in "An Essay" about passions and gratification, freedom for Locke prevents blind impulses to some degree as it allows us to reflect on myriad choices. But freedom of the will is absurd as it means we would be willing to will something, and for Locke this leads to an infinite cognitive regress, which is also absurd. Freedom of action is different though. For Locke "The voluntary is not opposed to the necessary, but the involuntary." (ibid.) and this is demonstrated by his man in the locked room.

However, there are problems with Locke’s account concerning his notions of volition and free will, many philosophers are suspicious of volitionism and they feel that it has no real foundation in experience. Is volition a good way of explaining acts of freewill? Some critics claim that volition is superfluous and that all that is required for action to take place is desire, and Locke has admitted that desire plays an important role in the casual chain of willing and action himself. It seems however that desiring, without volition, would just result in wishful thinking and idle thoughts. Desire itself is not enough to cause action in an agent. As Lowe points out, a building collapses which is caused by an explosion, which in turn is caused by sparks. One cannot say that the sparks alone caused the collapse, the explosion was an integral part to the chain of causal events leading to it. Similarly, one cannot deny volitions part in willing, desire alone is not enough. Note also that volition is not involved in a simple a chain of events like the collapsing building, it has to be remembered that the willing is part of the acting. "..in order to act agents need, in addition to belief and desire, what Locke describes as a certain ‘power’- the will - the exercise of which constitutes volition or willing....." (ibid. p138).

It is also important to note that "...volitions...are not propositional attitudes: we do not will that such-and-such be the case, but rather we will to do something..." (Lowe. E. J., "On Human Understanding". p138). This also means that an agent must be able to freely will something, which is why, to use Locke’s example, we can will to walk, but not to fly, as flying is not in our power. Another important refutation of a criticism involves the intention to will. It has been argued that an agent only need intend to do something for an action to come about. But intention means that you mean to do something later, whereas willing is doing something at the very moment of willing. So intentions cannot explain actions (though it can explain actions to be carried out in the future, though an act of will is ultimately required). So this kind of anti-volitionist argument does not stand criticism either.

Conclusion

Having stood up to the brief criticisms of this essay it seems that Locke’s notions of free will and volition are satisfactory. Though a lengthy and detailed discussion of his notions is likely to create fatal problems for his ideas as many of them seem rather obscure and contradictory, and even Lowe confesses that the reader has to interpret Locke’s meaning himself to some degree. Because of this, and perhaps because Locke does not adhere to a rigid logical system like Leibniz, his philosophy avoids many of the problems Leibniz’s does.

Leibniz, on the other hand, is deeply inconsistent concerning punishment and the Christian elements of his doctrine. With regards to the hypothetical Judas, does not Leibniz’s philosophy make Judas a moral hero? His actions brought about the atonement of the human race. In fact, all criminals and evil doers are heroes as they are adding to "the best of all possible worlds" - the more that is done, the more there is, then (according to Leibniz, as existence is good) the better. Leibniz is using two different sets of irreconcilable criteria here that tell Judas what he should and should not be doing. For Leibniz though, because we are ignorant we should act dutifully and know our duty. But, what is the point, on a metaphysical level, of being dutiful if all actions contribute to the best of all possible worlds? Also, what is the point of hell and punishment? God has designed these sinners, he is where the buck stops! Leibniz says punishment is a deterrent and a corrective. But this suggests that there are causes of human actions - which is inconsistent with his earlier principles. Punishment not only presupposes causality, but freewill. Also, as we are only finite, we do not have Gods knowledge of monads and the future. We cannot see ahead. God knows what is going to happen, but we don’t , so we appear free - but this is only the appearance of freedom.

Bibliography

Cottingham, J. "Western Philosophy, an anthology" (Blackwell 1996)

Loemker, L. "Philosophical Papers and Letters" (D. Reidel Publishing Company 1969)

Lowe. E. J., "On Human Understanding" (Routledge 1995)

Locke, J. "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding" (Everyman 1996)

Okruhlik, K. and Brown, J. R. (eds.) "The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz" (Reidel Publishing Company 1982)

Rescher, N. "G. W. Leibniz’s Monadology" (Routledge 1991)

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