Does religion introduce a frivolous kind of morality?

"It is certain, that, in every religion, however sublime the verbal definition which it gives of its divinity, many of the votaries, perhaps the greatest number, will seek the divine favour, not by virtue and good morals, which alone can be acceptable to a perfect being, but either by frivolous observances, by intemperate zeal, by rapturous extasies, or by the belief of mysterious and absurd opinions." (David Hume "The Natural History of Religion" p179, my emphasis).

"All those duties are imaginary, since they are only conventional." (The Marquis de Sade, "The One Hundred and Twenties Days of Sodom" p45).

"There are no moral phenomena at all, only a moral interpretation of phenomena..." (Friedrich Nietzsche, "Beyond Good and Evil" p96).

It seems most likely that religion introduces a frivolous kind of morality, and it is my task to show this within the confines of this short essay, so I will concentrate mainly on the Western tradition of the Christian church with regards to the above question. But not only will I try to show that religion introduces a frivolous kind of morality, but also a dangerous, wrong-headed, inauthentic and life- denying morality of weakness and abjection.

Sacrifice and Asceticism

The Christian faith is from the beginning a sacrifice and involves what seems to be a protracted suicide of reason via a leap of faith; leading for some to deny life itself. The Christian sacrifices himself to God through his worship, which so often seem to be for totally frivolous reasons. "Love thy neighbour" is the major Christian tenet alongside "Love thy God"; but perhaps this has become (or always was) "abase yourself before God". "At one time one sacrificed human beings to one’s god, perhaps precisely those human beings one loved best....Then in the moral epoch of mankind, one sacrificed to one’s god the strongest instincts one possessed, one’s ‘nature’..." (F. Nietzsche "Beyond Good and Evil" p81).

Religious devotion seems to enhance superstitious practises, absurd beliefs and an austere zeal. Denial and penitence are the ways Christians have served their God, not always through virtue and agape. And how useful can this be? Does it not strike one as a waste of time to abstain from food, sex and company? Does not it seem to be a waste of one’s whole life? In "The Virtues" by Peter Geach he recalls a conversation with a Hindu who points out that the east has offered by far the more impressively austere aesthetics. Geach retorted that he is glad of it; that there is no point in asceticism beyond itself, and were it not for God’s law it would be wholly futile. The point being, that for the theist human life can still have a telos comprehensible to the non-believer - it is only the likeliness of the outcome that the atheist balks at, not the intelligibility of the practice in the light of theistic factual beliefs. My (rather long winded) point being that religious practices only seem "frivolous" in the light of religions being factually mistaken. Not to draw attention to this is to be an unimaginative unbeliever. But given that we don’t know what it is to lead a worthwhile human life/follow the right rules (or even which of these two is the right way of thinking of ethics) then these kinds of virtues, the kind that are called ascetic, seem pointless; and how they can please God is quite a mystery.

These special acts of devotion can only relate to God since this is the only reason they exist. Other acts of morality, worthwhile acts, like charity, could have been performed were there never a religious nature and no-one gave a second thought to God. No other motive except God (and perhaps the fear of God) could have moved someone to scourge himself for a blood thirsty God who required such barbarous acts of penitence (unless a great number of Christian ascetics were masochists). "The preponderance of feelings of displeasure over feelings of pleasure is the cause of a fictitious morality and religion..." (F. Nietzsche "The Anti-Christ").

The Marquis de Sade foreshadowed Nietzsche when he denounced Christianity as a religion of victims, and replacing it with an ideology of force. De Sade’s charges against societies morality is that it is artificial, and so imaginary. De Sade believed in the law of nature, survival of the fittest, claiming that "We are all alike, except in strength." Nietzsche also saw this and demands of man that he reject the morality of the herd and create his own, independent and powerful system of morality. He sees practices like asceticism as a defiance of oneself, in the existentialist sense this could be an inauthentic life. The ascetics "...tyrannise over certain parts of their own nature.." (Nietzsche "A Nietzsche reader" p215), but this is life denying and weak, it is a "..mockery of one’s own nature.."(ibid.). Like De Sade, Nietzsche demands an outward show of tyranny exemplified by the will to power and a rejection of such life denying attitudes like asceticism and Christianity. Nietzsche considers Christianity and other religions with their moral systems to be the result of "..The feeling of impotence..." which lead to "..superstitious practices..." a "..wasted and useless constituent of all the activity hitherto pursued by man!" (ibid. p217).

Agape and Fear

"So anxious or so tedious are even the best scenes of life, that futurity is still the object of all out hopes and fears. We incessantly look forward, and endeavour, by prayers, adoration, and sacrifice, to appease those unknown powers, whom we find, by experience, so able to afflict and oppress us. Wretched creatures that we are! What resource for us amidst the innumerable ills of life, did not religion suggest some methods of atonement, and appease those terrors, with which we are incessantly agitated and tormented?" (D. Hume "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion" p95).

This kind of religious anxiety of which Hume is speaking seems to be the bases of frivolous religious morality. Doubling the fervour of atonement and such like, is the fear of suffering. "The fear of pain, even of the infinitely small in pain - cannot end otherwise than in a religion of love..." (Nietzsche, F., "A Nietzsche Reader" p190). It is this fear of pain that reduces the religious believer to frivolous moralities, moralities with no real worldly meaning - like agape. This morality is frivolous because it shrinks away from reality - because of the fear of reality, the fear of the pain of real life. It is not real, and indeed cannot be real, as discussed below. "Ultimately ‘love of one’s neighbour’ is always something secondary, in part conventional and arbitrarily illusory, when compared with fear of one’s neighbour.... here again fear is the mother of all morality.". (Nietzsche, F., "Beyond Good and Evil" p123). If fear is one of the motives behind Christian morality, then it is not really moral - it is frivolous. But - "The fear of God is the beginning of all wisdom". There is no denying that God provides people lacking in natural sympathies with very good reason (or threat or promise) to behave themselves. But - "that is not then morality". Well, what is it? It is fear, it is not good intentions.

Agape and Egoism

What does agape say about Christian morality? At first glance one might feel that is it very noble to "love thy neighbour", indeed, much has been done for human welfare as a result of this middle axiom, this central tenet of Christianity. However, the Christian religion is very much concerned with the motives of an action, and so it is the motives of any act of agape that actually count. I do not believe that any Christian has ever undertaken a true act of agape - our human situation and psychology makes agape unrealistic. But is the good intention of the agent a necessary component of a morally worthwhile action? Some kind of case must be offered for saying that it is, and it is Christianity that offers this, with it’s emphasis on personal conscience and choice. Though one must take into account Church dogma and doctrine, it is agape that is at the heart of all of Christian morality, it is this intention.

"To love men for the sake of God - that has been the noblest and most remote feeling attained to among men up till now." (Friedrich Nietzsche, "Beyond Good and Evil" p85). Like the frivolous acts of atonement and asceticism that Christians have engaged in, agape shows to be equally frivolous in that humans have been lead by it, not for our sakes, not for the betterment of humanity, but because God has commanded it and that doing what God says is the actual motive behind agape. Is it possible that every Christian who has ever lived has not had a loving or charitable thought in his head? Yes - because what is likely is that the Christian, like every other human, is merely looking after his own interests deep down, even though some of his actions seemed - on the surface - charitable and loving. It is some task to prove this basic human egoism however.

For Thrasymachus, the man who Socrates argues with for a while in Plato’s "Republic", "Ordinary morality is simply the behaviour imposed by exploiter on exploited, and is thus "someone else’s interest".... he also maintains that, on the level of ordinary day- to-day behaviour, the pursuit of self-interest, in its narrowest and most obvious form, is both natural and right...." (Plato "The Republic" p25 - Penguin Classics). This is important, as here in the Republic we begin to see the difference between the man who admits egoism - the Tyrant - and the weak man - the Christian - and what makes them so: the extent of their power.

Nietzsche saw human nature as an egoistic battle for power. He had history on his side, as it seems most humans who influenced history on a grand scale had some sort of power - and power is always achieved at anothers cost. Again in "The Republic" Glaucon also points out that any man would become a Tyrant if he were strong and able enough and he uses the example of the ring of Gyges as an example to show that "...no man is just of his own free will, but only under compulsion, and that no man thinks justice pays him personally, since he will do wrong when he gets the chance." (ibid. p47). The man with the ring of Gyges (that is to say, the man who is strong enough) is now powerful enough to take what he wants, and will do so as a result. Morality means nothing to him now, it no longer serves a purpose for him sufficient enough to justify him following such a system as he does not need it, he is strong enough without it. The compulsion of which Glaucon speaks could be seen as the coercion by God - after all, if one is not to follow Christian morality one is threatened with eternal damnation.

The nature of the egoist’s character is an issue important to the discussion of this essay - and as to whether mankind is capable of agape, or whether it is a frivolous waste of effort. To take some good examples of the Tyrant one only needs look to Kurtz in Joseph Conrad’s "Heart of Darkness" and at the Marquis de Sade. In "Heart of Darkness" Kurtz rejects his culture’s morality, and as a result becomes the savages’ white god, but succeeds where Marlow, the moral protagonist, fails. Conrad observes the capability of humans for evil when certain restraints are removed. "Mr Kurtz lacked restraint in the gratification of his various lusts, that there was something wanting in him..." ( J. Conrad "Heart of Darkness" p95 Penguin). "Heart of Darkness" supports Nietzsche view to some extent that nature is beyond good and evil. By nature all men are unequal; morality is an invention of the weak to limit and deter the strong and power is the supreme virtue of man. In Conrad’s jungle, his heart of darkness, there are no restraints, and power is exercised over the weak. However, one must note that Kurtz fails to become anything like Nietzsche’s Overman which will be discussed later. Kurtz’s existential attempt to define himself as an individual fails, and his heroic attempt to break free of societies morality and to recreate a new set of parameters becomes savagery.

The Marquis de Sade is yet another immoral egoist who illustrates what happens when a man accepts his true egoistic self; when he has triumphed over frivolous moralities like agape (some commentators claim that his work heralds Nietzsche and Freud). De Sade was violently egoistic and used his position to satiate his lusts "What does one want when one is engaged in the sexual act? That everything around you give you its utter attention, think only of you, care only for you.... every man wants to be a tyrant when he fornicates.... tastes all the pleasures which a vigorous individual feels in making full use of his strength; he dominates, he is a tyrant." (The Marquis de Sade "The One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom" p8 my emphasis). However, despite his sadism and powerful position, some commentators, like Simone de Beauvoir, have felt "There is no hint of ambition in him, no spirit of enterprise, no will to power, and I am quite prepared to believe that he was a coward." (ibid. p8 my emphasis).

This is important, as it is the will to power that we are now really concerned with here. An egoist must have a will to power and succeed if he is to be truly strong. Failure is a mark of weakness, success is strength. Religious morality like agape is for those with no real will to power, and according to Nietzsche, man must strive towards the goal of the Overman, or fail, and it is only the strength of his will to power that will enable this. Kurtz is not strong enough to create his own morality outside of society, and de Sade tries with a controversial degree of success "He subordinated his existence to his eroticism... he chose the imaginary" (ibid. p9) which means that de Sade’s life was inauthentic in the existentialist sense. De Sade attempts at creating a moral system justifying his sexuality, and in doing so, seems to exhibit the will to power. But despite his attempts at a coherent philosophy "...there was in de Sade an inner weakness which was inadequately masked by his arrogance. Society was lodged in his heart in the guise of guilt." (ibid. p35).

De Sade parodied the world and its morality rather than creating a new one. However, de Sade shows the Tyrant to be a strong man when he says, through Blamont’s mouth (in "Aline et Valcour") "I have supported my deviations with reasons; I did not stop at mere doubt; I have vanquished, I have uprooted; I have destroyed everything in my heart that might have interfered with my pleasures." (ibid. p40). Is this strength, destroying normal frivolous morality to replace with your own - is this the will to power? Or was is a defence of himself, a result of cowardice, a retreat? The answer to this would tell us whether humans really are egoists and whether the reinvention of morality can only be undertaken by the strong, Nietzsche’s Overman and that religion does in fact introduce a frivolous kind of morality.

Conclusion

Though it cannot be denied that Christianity has achieved many things that have helped people and improved areas of the world that were somehow in need of help, as well as encourage the individual towards a life of virtue and instilled some with hope, it is evident that Christianity ultimately promotes a frivolous kind of morality. How can this be so? With it’s emphasis on doing good for God’s sake or for your own salvation’s sake as opposed to the other man’s sake, and with it’s unconvincing doctrines that the good man (what ever a "good man" is) will go to heaven, and with it’s emphasis on atonement and sin, one can see just how frivolous and life denying such a moral system is - without God and the threats and promises of hell and heaven, a moral system like Christianity might have achieved more if it was not distracted by these things. In agreement with Hume I earlier said "Other acts of morality, worthwhile acts, like charity, could have been performed were there never a religious nature and no-one gave a second thought to God" but if what I have said about human egoism is true and if we were to abandon religious morality, we would have a very different kind of ethical system. We would recognise that what is really good is not morality, but the feeling of power which, when a man feels it, he calls it good. Whoever is the strongest has the ability to deem what he likes as good or evil, and it is this Overman, a man with control over his own self and morality, that men should strive to attain, not unthinking frivolous morality. Note that Nietzsche is not rejecting morality wholesale, he is demanding a new morality, and a thinking reflecting man.

This kind of morality is for the strong, as only the strong can attain it through acceptance of their egoism. Herd morality is for the weak, for those who cannot find their own morality. Nietzsche is not an amoralist or an immoralist but he wants a different kind of morality - an authentic one, or an independent thinking morality, not a blindly accepted and non-reflective one. If one has thought properly about morality and come to your own conclusions, then this is strength, the strength to be independent and authentic. Though religion can offer furtherance to morality, it is better to abandon it and its distractions. It is these metaphysical and psychological distractions that make a religious morality a frivolous one. I end this essay with the quotation from Hume I began it with:

"It is certain, that, in every religion, however sublime the verbal definition which it gives of its divinity, many of the votaries, perhaps the greatest number, will seek the divine favour, not by virtue and good morals, which alone can be acceptable to a perfect being, but either by frivolous observances, by intemperate zeal, by rapturous extasies, or by the belief of mysterious and absurd opinions." (David Hume "The Natural History of Religion" p179, my emphasis).

Bibliography

Conrad, J., "Heart of Darkness" (Penguin 1995)

The Marquis de Sade "The One Hundred and Twenty Days of Sodom" with an introduction by

Simone de Beauvoir, "Should we burn Sade?" (Arrow Books Ltd 1990)

Hume, D., "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion" (Oxford University Press 1993)

Hume, D., "The Natural History of Religion" (Oxford University Press 1993)

Nietzsche, F., "Beyond Good and Evil" (Penguin Classics 1990)

Nietzsche, F., "A Nietzsche Reader" (Penguin Classics 1990)

Plato, "The Republic" (Penguin Classics 1987)

Williams, B., "Morality" (Cambridge University Press 1993)

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