There are various political mechanisms available which provide some form of representation for every voter participating in an elective democracy. However, these mechanisms are problematic for various reasons. This essay will be concerned as to how and why these mechanisms are failing women in particular. Judith Squires illustrates the problem with precision and brevity "The need to consider mechanisms for group representation... is created by the exclusion of the interests and perspectives of women from this particular ideological agenda."(1) Initially we must be clear what the central concept of representation is and why it is problematic, or else we cannot fully discuss the available and alternative mechanisms of representation. Then a discussion of the mechanisms themselves, tied in with an conceptual understanding of groups (specifically, women as a group) will allow us to come to some conclusions concerning current and possible alternative mechanisms.

Oppression

Initially I want to make it clear that I will be talking in terms of oppression, not solely marginalisation. Iris Young writes that marginalisation is one of the five conditions that must be met if a group is to be considered oppressed. Marginalisation is the exclusion of a group from participation in major social activities (like representing themselves). Though this is the major concern of this essay, the other factors play a part regarding the problem of representation in the UK. These are: exploitation, where the benefits of work go on to other without reciprocity; powerlessness, where others have authority over the group and there is little autonomy; cultural imperialism, where the group is stereotyped and they have less chances for self-expression; random violence, motivated by fear or hatred.(2) All of these conditions apply to women globally to some degree or another.

Representation

Representation is widely accepted by academics, activists and even some politicians as an essentially contested concept with a variety of interrelated meanings and uses; indeed, it is a concept that it may not even be possible to strictly practice.(3) Hanna Pitkin’s simple definition that "(R)epresenting here means acting in the interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them" will suffice for our purposes.(4) Representation is best understood via the forms employed to fulfil it, to which we will soon turn. Presently, it is more important to understand that representation is not only vague in meaning, but oppressive in practice because presently representation is not doing what Pitkin claims it does.

This concept has been defined by our liberal tradition is such a way that it is "gender blind". This means that all people are represented as people, with no other recognition of their particular identity other than a universal and abstract citizenship which is in fact historically equated with the masculine.(5) This notion of equality is based on the idea that all must be treated the same as all are equally the same, but this is a form of assimilation that imposes dominant values and norms on oppressed groups.(6) "Founded by men, the modern state and its public realm of citizenship paraded as universal values and norms which were derived from specifically masculine experience."(7) Gender blindness ignores the specific identities and issues associated with women. It does not equalise, but simply ignores because equality has been conceived as sameness.(8) Finally, though the law is in some ways blind to group difference, the wider society is not. This tension does not typically result in a useful acknowledgment of difference, but instead it often results in exclusion and rejection.(9) This issue of female group identity and its stigmatising as deviant from the male paradigm is a widely discussed problem in feminist theory which poses a major form of oppression.(10)

Forms of Representation

We can understand the various concepts of representation through the variety of means by which it is put into practice. The many various representational mechanisms found throughout our society are based upon four major representative theories. These four logically distinct forms hinge upon normative differences concerning the practice of representation.(11) The first form of representation is the delegated representative, also called the agent-principle form. This is the form of representation by a person on behalf of others and their interests (like a lawyer or spokesperson). The second form is microcosmic representation and refers to the characteristics of a group (like a representative sample). The third form is symbolic representation where a group is represented in a more abstract way that is typically historically rooted or traditional (for example, by a monarch or flag). The fourth form is the elective mode, a process of authorisation by which a person is given permission to exercise their judgement and talents for what is considered best by them and their voters.(12) This mode is institutionalised as the primary mechanism of representation in the UK, but it is failing to represent women. As a result this and other mechanisms for representation must be assessed to come to some diagnosis as to what is wrong, so as to help provide a treatment. However, first it is necessary to have a working understanding of the group with who’s representation we are concerned.

Women and Groups - Difference and Presence

Young provides a clear understanding of what constitutes a group and of what types of group there are. This is necessary, because otherwise talk of group representation would be obscure and confusing, so we need to understand what kind of group women constitute. Young writes of three types of group. The first is an interest group which is an association of persons striving for the same ends. The second is a social group, these people share a way of life and practices and some interests. The third is an ideological group, a group who have shared political beliefs. These groups can overlap and some can foster others.(13) The difficulty with women’s representation lies with the fact that women can and do belong to any or all of these groups. The problem lies primarily with the multifaceted reality of women’s identity. Like any person’s identity, a woman’s identity is more than her gender. This does not mean women cannot be successfully represented as women, but it does mean they cannot be successfully represented solely as a gender.(14)

There are two distinct problems associated with the representation of women as a group that can be drawn from this complexity. The first is the problem of group essentialism. The second is the problem of women’s identity under patriarchal oppression. Anne Phillips outlines the charge of essentialism against the notion of a group. Defining women as a group sediments their identities and exaggerates ascribed characteristics leading to an obscuring of the differences between the individual women within the group "women", resulting in a false homogeneity just as oppressive as the wider society.(15) However Phillips also points out that this charge is invalid. There is a difference between the group and its members, which can and must be emphasised to overcome this difficulty. Therefore it is not the group that is being represented, but the group members.(16) This is achieved by reflecting the diversity of "subject positions" (or differences) within the structure of the group. Since no list of differences can be complete, particularly because identities are always changing, this diversity can only be learnt through trial and error allowed by group autonomy.(17) A group is thus understood in relational terms between its members, rather than in terms of common attributes.(18)

The notion of difference is also used as a tool towards solving the second problem of identity. Women’s identity is a central issue in feminist theory, something which must be examined and deconstructed and then re-created outside the prison of subjection; a task that can barely be sketched here. Phillips outlines the problem thus: "The relationship between the sexes is peculiar in one respect, for each sex is defined precisely through its relation to the other... the categorising of people by their physiognomy... only makes sense in relationships of domination and subordination."(19) Phillips is not advocating androgyny or asexuality, but is writing about the false and oppressive enforced homogeneity found in the binary idea that there are "men" and "women". For Phillips, the first step towards a new identity for women is the recognition of difference between the two gender groups and within these groups.

One of the primary differences between men and women is that women are experiencing domination and oppression within a male-dominated culture. This experience is evident in the political gender gap (amongst many other problems). The gender gap is a lack of interest and identification with mainstream party politics. Squires discusses this as a "positive statement of disillusionment and discontent." This is because the political agenda is set mainly by men, alienating women from it.(20) Indeed, those very women who do gain representative powers do not mark their political careers with their sexual identities because of this sense of diffidence.(21) The point is not that women are not interested in politics at all, but that they typically organise outside of state structures and are not involved in politics in the way that men are.(22) As a result, they are much less represented in parliament and have less power to make the decisions that men do.(23) The mechanisms that supposedly allows all of us to be represented as equal individuals are failing for this very reason.

Though representation appears to be flawed, this is only because we are assuming that women’s representation is possible if it is women who do the representing. This assumption can be supported by Phillip’s notion of the politics of ideas and the politics of presence. The politics of ideas concerns beliefs and interests where accountability is of great import, here it is interest and ideological groups that are represented; this is how we presently operate. The politics of presence concerns peoples’ identities and those of their representatives. It is shared experience that allows one to represent another in this case, so here it is social groups that are represented.(24) Phillips understands the latter politics to represent women the best. Squires considers the idea problematic for several reasons however. The politics of presence assumes that men cannot empathise with women’s situation and do something about it themselves.(25) It poses a threat to national unity. It detracts from pursuits towards the common good. It is much harder to define a social group than an interest group. It will work to "reify and normalise identities in a manner that might then be used to resubordinate the group in question."(26) This last objection of essentialism can be fended off using the conclusions above regarding the requirement for a variety of "subject positions". The objection regarding empathy is self-defeating "for the perspectives and interests of the privileged will tend to dominate... marginalizing or silencing those of other groups."(27) It is quite evident that empathy only goes so far. If men could fully empathise with women not only would women be represented in such a way that the whole issue would not be a problem, but women would not be oppressed in the first place.(28) Absurd as this argument is, it is often used by detractors of quotas and affirmative action (discussed below). The following two objections concerning national unity and common good are cleverly disguised forms of conservatism. The terms "unity" and "common" yet again invoke the gender blind lie, where the terms refer to masculine values posing as universal values. In a nation of men where what is commonly though of as good are men’s values, these things need to be challenged. In addition to this, Young calms the fear underlying the objection that oppressed groups will be selfish. There is no contradiction in maintaining group identity and public spiritedness.(29) The final objection of definition is a problem of accountability. However, group nebulousness can also be a strength which again fends off the problem of essentialism and resubordination; a group is more open to change and redrawing its strategies if it is not easily pigeonholed and restricted.

An examination of the available and alternative mechanisms which should allow women’s representation is now necessary.

Current Practiced Mechanisms for Representation

The two most discussed and widely implemented mechanisms for women’s increased representation are quotas and affirmative action. Quotas are an important mechanism for readdressing the minority of women in the House of Commons. There are three reasons as identified by Squires. The first reason concerns the unfairness of sexual segregation and is an issue of justice. The second reason is the promotion of the different values and experience of women; it is about diversity, tolerance and the enrichment of politics that will come from the new perspectives women will bring. The third is that men cannot represent or fully empathise with women, as noted above.(30) Squires considers the last two reasons to be under-emphasised, resulting in the quotas debate centering around fairness more than representation.(31) This reason maintains the assumption that fairness necessitates a microcosm form of representation, which is the impetus behind the quotas mechanism.(32) Though representation in this way does not guarantee favourable decisions for women, it does allow them a presence. Parliamentary presence is important because "unless confronted with different perspectives on social relations and events, different values and language, most people tend to assert their own perspective as universal."(33) If there is no presence then "political systems are... not likely to represent previously under-represented groups".(34) Thus it seems exclusion is the foundation and fortification of oppression. This is the important point where quotas are concerned; it is a matter of "recognising the equal value of different cultures" which "involves not only letting them survive, but acknowledging their worth."(35) This acknowledgment can then go further into valourisation, where women can celebrate their identities in an atmosphere of liberty. Presence in parliament via quotas appears to be a major line of attack towards this happy vision, but a line which is still blocked by the ramparts and portcullis of patriarchal oppression.

Affirmative action is that second mechanism that is currently employed for the benefit of oppressed groups. Despite the claims of its detractors, affirmative action is a useful mechanism which can be applied to all forms of representation inside and outside the party political sphere. Women need to be represented in other arenas, like male dominated careers, and in different and women-defined ways and roles so as to escape stereotypes, like within the media for example. We can critically assess this mechanism by examining the claims of a Micheal Levin. Levin argues against the implementation of affirmative quotas by charging the affirmed women with incompetence, which males apparently do not have.(36) Levin does not consider that the women chosen can be equally or more competent than the men, assuming instead that women are incompetent per se. He also does not consider that those women who appear equally competent on paper (i.e. the quality and number of their qualifications and experience) have had a more difficult time attaining this level of competence compared to their male counterparts due to institutional sexism found in the educational system and employment. In this sense women are more competent, because they have had to overcome more difficulties.

Evidence for institutionalised sexism is clearly laid out by Harris and Narayan. Established rules and practices like networking (eighty percent of executives find their jobs this way), the "old boy network" (years or generations of social and business contacts between men), word of mouth recruitment (eighty-six percent of jobs do not appear in classifieds), and stereotypes (which Levin proclaims as true and genetically determined)(37) are all aspects of institutionalised sexism. Studies demonstrate that sexism operates even when there is no direct contact with the woman concerned. Hiring process favour white men, and women are treated inappropriately and with intimidation.(38) Furthermore, despite the largest number of women being in parliament at this time, institutionalised sexism continues even in Westminster. There are no baby creches there, breast-feeding mothers and babies are barred from the entire building except one small room and legislators often vote until late at night. Tess Kingham is leaving parliament at the next election in protest over this disregard for and segregation of women (especially mothers) in Westminster.(39)

Levin continues, claiming that the men bypassed by the process of affirmative action are "not themselves responsible for women’s currently constricted aspirations." Levin overlooks the cultural fact that men are collectively responsible for the oppression of women, whether this is in the way they socialise and stunt their daughters, belittle and demean their girlfriends in bantering with their "mates," emotionally exploit or beat their partners, or in the opinions they hold (consciously and maliciously or not) about women in general.(40) Levin, like most detractors of affirmative action, also has no sense of history. He claims that the compensation justification for affirmative action is unjustified where women are concerned because of the injuries "slavery, segregation and the lynch mob" inflicted upon blacks, there are "no remotely comparable injuries... done to women."(41) Levin revisionism is comparable to holocaust denial and just as vile. Levin does not consider important (or is not aware of) the slavery of prostitution, the historical segregation of women from many activities like work, education and religion or the countless Indian suttee burnings, genital mutilations, Chinese foot bindings, gynaecological experiments and European witch trails which resulted in rape, torture and hanging, burning or roasting of the accused.(42) Not to mention the countless rapings, beatings, emotional torments, exploitative practices and psychic murders carried out by men (and indeed fellow women) of all cultures and ethnicities throughout history and prehistory. Compensation is a problematic part of affirmative action, not because these atrocities did not happen, but because "this rationale implies that the problems is one of ‘damaged individuals’ rather than a problem due to structures, practices and institutional criteria within our institutions..."(43) It is better to understand affirmative action in terms of equalising opportunity. No-one is being compensated, but women are being given a chance in institutions that are prejudiced against them, where otherwise their chances would be much lower. The worried white man, should be reassured that "the only costs to non-beneficiaries that result from affirmative action policies are the loss of privileges, privileges that are the results of a lack of fairness to and opportunity for others."(44)

The only problems with the mechanisms of affirmative action and political quotas are the charges of political fixing and the possibility of tokenism and condescension. With regards to the former problem, Phillips makes it clear that these fixes are necessary. She writes that "when political exclusion is such a marked feature of contemporary democratic life, it seems inappropriate to rely on distant prospects of a more robustly participatory democracy or structural changes in social and economic conditions."(45) With regards to the latter problem, it lies with the fear that women’s endeavours are being devalued and they are only reaching the positions they want via this mechanism. They are rewarded not for their abilities, but for their position as oppressed women. This is an understandable fear and women may feel patronised if they were affirmed solely because they are oppressed. This is evident in Maddock’s protest that "we want... equality of opportunity, not equality of outcome."(46) But, as noted above, woman should be judged on their competence with due consideration taken to the struggle against prejudice they have endured. Affirmative action may be seen as a hollow and patronising gift bestowed by men as a placebo to salve the problem, giving women a token place in a man’s world so as to give the impression that all is in fact well. But affirmative action can and does give women real opportunities to change this situation, and tokenism is like any other facade; it can be unmasked as the distortion it is. With the kind of discrimination women face now outlined, affirmative action is obviously a necessary mechanism that must continue to be employed, improved and defended, to give women and other oppressed groups a chance in covertly and overtly biased systems which are incapable of any immediate changes in action, structure or consciousness.

Very few other mechanisms are available for ensuring effective representation for women. Those mechanism that are available are less direct in their influence and concern all citizens. Among these new mechanisms are: "citizens juries, focus groups, conferences and deliberative opinion polls... community forums, neighbourhood committees (and) referendums."(47) Though these mechanisms might redress the problem of "legitimacy deficit" and low election turn outs, they could be exploited by unrepresentative groups. As a result they do not necessarily ensure representation for oppressed groups, indeed, they could exacerbate such problems.(48) This may mean other, more radical mechanisms are necessary. A number of alternative mechanisms have been suggested by theorists which also require assessment even though they are not available in practice in this country.

Alternative Mechanisms for Representation

The three most important suggested mechanisms are: random sampling, proportional representation and special rights. Squires sites James Fishkin’s suggestion of random sampling "as a way of combating the power of money and the media in current elections."(49) This is a laudable reason and an interesting idea, but it leaves the way open for bizarre and dangerous results, it is even possible that women may be excluded all together. These problems are due to the very nature of randomness and its innate unreliability. Also, this system would have to allow people to opt out (like jury duty), thus excluding those who might opt out because they feel that do not know enough about politics or do not care, or are intimidated by the idea. Indeed, those that do accept may not be able to handle or understand the pressures of government. This highlights the need for a better educational system where politics is concerned. After all, we live in a country where students cannot opt into a politics class until A-Level, after most students have left school, and it is only in university that most students who opt into the subject even begin to realise the basics.

Proportional representation is a more likely candidate for an alternative mechanism. The importance of the electoral process cannot be understated, as "elections are the vital link between representative and the represented. They provide both a mechanism for choosing representatives and for controlling them."(50) Supporters of proportional representation claim that the present first-past-the-post system discriminates against women, against ethnic minorities, against geographically dispersed parties and against voters who’s candidate lost the constituency or who’s party lost the nation.(51) Proportional representation ensures large proportions of women in parliament because parties must broaden their appeal to women and include more on their lists.(52) Furthermore, "the electoral process adopted makes a big difference to the actual composition of legislatures."(53)

Finally, special rights are a mechanism which might be used to ensure representation for oppressed groups. Young writes that special rights are necessary for group representation when the group can provide a particular perspective guided by its socio-historical situation, when its member’s interests will be affected and when these interests and perceptions necessitate expression. The proposed special rights correspond to these exigencies. These rights are; the ability to form and self-organise into groups; that these groups have a veto power regarding policies that specifically affect that group; and that relevant institutions must take the groups perspectives into consideration, respectively.(54) These special rights would overcome oppressive cultural imperialism and allow group autonomy, and as a result, self organisation and definition of identity and subject positions. However Foucault considers the concept of rights to be problematic. Though Foucault has no interest in denying our rights, he shows that rights do not defend one against disciplinary power. This is because disciplinary power organises the temperament and mentality of individuals through bodily manipulation, repetition and limitation, but does not violate institutionalised rights. The humanist liberalism of "rights" focuses "on consent as the privileged site of political and social legitimacy", but this notion is undermined by "discipline" which is non-consensual, working on an entirely different level of influence which individuals may not even be aware of.(55)

Conclusion

Despite these possibilities the problems underlying the mechanisms still remain. Essentialism is a recurring problem threatening that "any mechanism for representing women will... also become a mechanism for constituting the category of woman." This is because politics perpetuates interests and identities and excludes others.(56) This would make "subject positions" difficult to form within such a constituted category without the special right of self-organisation in place. Furthermore, if the solution of "subject positions" that Philip’s offers cannot salve this issue, then Squires claims this problem of essentialism will engender the further problems of ghettoization and "ressentiment".(57) These problems and the difficulty with representational mechanisms result from the basic problem of representation, the "indignity of speaking for others" of which Deleuze writes.(58) Speaking on any other’s behalf is dangerous because it involves the "…practice of defining what is normal in a group and attempting to hold people to that norm." Todd May suggests the "anti-representationalist principle" which is an attempt to avoid telling people who they are, so that they can define themselves as needs must.(59) However, this solution maybe just as bad as the problems if the principle is not accompanied by the types of conscious-raising exercises of prior decades which encouraged discussions, self-awareness and self-definition of women. Otherwise women’s identities will be defined for them by the patriarchal morass in which they are caught, through practices like "gender-blindness" and subsequent assimilation, which feminists are striving to avoid.

Despite this difficulty, the problem of identity suggests the same solution to Squires, Young and Phillips. Phillips writes that women must be recognised rather than just tolerated.(60) This necessitates a demand for more than just recognition. Squires makes this demand clear when she writes that "feminists need to address both recognition and redistribution... women are subject to both economic and cultural injustice."(61) The demand for recognition via representation is thus a radical one: it requires a wider change in society, not just the practices of parliament. This is to be achieved by "acknowledging group difference in capacities, needs, culture, and cognitive styles", an understanding of difference that is celebrative and not "understood as deviance or deficiency".(62) This will require a new form of democracy whose rejuvenation will require the experiences of women and other oppressed groups, bringing about a tolerance, diversity and enrichment in politics. This rejection of the assimilation of women’s identities into the false neutrality of male domination is based on the normative value that attachment to specific practices, language and other cultural forms is a necessary aspect of social existence.(63) This value suggests separatism as another alternative to these representative mechanisms. Feminists like Lynn Segal have noted the dangers in this strategy and warns that women cannot escape or abandon the struggle within and against the patriarchal state.(64) Yet separatism remains as the last defence for women, but also perhaps the most practically complex and theoretically radical. To this end feminist separatist Lia Cigarini recognises that "sexual difference cannot signify without transgression, without a subversion of the existing order. It can’t simply be traced over the received symbolic order...".(65) If this is the case, and if essentialism is a dangerous as some commentators claim, then separatism and radical rejection of the present system of democracy may be the only way women can escape subordination or re-subordination and ensure representation by some other means within some other system, and eventually liberty.

• Understanding the Roots of Thinking. 2003. Essay.
• Abortion. 2003. Essay.
• New Year's Resolutions. 2003. Essay.
• Designer Babies. 2002. Essay.
• Truth, Quantum Theory and Holism. 2002. Essay.
• The Future of Pornography. 2002. Essay.
• Female Discipline - enforcing the "feminine" body. 2002. Essay.
• Polyamory. 2002. Essay.
• Levine's "Harmful to Minors" 2002. Book Review.
• What is Patriotism?. 2002. Essay.
• The War On Terror is The War On You 2002. Essay.
• Privacy Under Threat 2001. Essay.
• Nature, Society, Morality 2001. Essay.
• Hierarchic Masculinity - Introduction 2001. Chapter 1.
• Hierarchic Masculinity - Everyday Consciousness Chapter 2.
• Hierarchic Masculinity - Hierarchy Chapter 3
• Hierarchic Masculinity - Bodies Chapter 4
• Hierarchic Masculinity - Others Chapter 5
• Hierarchic Masculinity - Conclusion Chapter 6
• Hierarchic Masculinity - Bibliography
• Nature and Intrinsic Value 2001. Essay
• The Representation of Women 2001. Essay
• Some Arguments for the Social and Legal Acceptance of Recreational Drugs 2001. Polemic
• America's Religious Right & Human Cell Cloning 2001. Polemic
• Ideology of the Green Party 2001. Essay
• Wittgenstein, Society and Language 2000. Essay
• Globalisation, Ethnicity and Nationalism 2000. Essay
• Foucault and the Self 2000. Essay
• Sartre and Erotic Love - Introduction 1999. Chapter 1
• Sartre and Erotic Love - Sado-masochism and the triple destructibility of erotic love 1999. Chapter 2
• Sartre and Erotic Love - Emotion and the Body 1999. Chapter 3
• Sartre and Erotic Love - Freedom, Choice and Authenticity 1999. Chapter 4
• Sartre and Erotic Love - Hermetic Words 1999. Chapter 5
• Sartre and Erotic Love - The Other: Perspectives 1999. Chapter 6
• Sartre and Erotic Love - Conclusion 1999. Chapter 7
• Sartre and Erotic Love - Bibliography 1999.
• Nietzsche and Christianity 1999. Essay
• Marx and Alienation 1999. Essay
• Adorno and Popular Music 1998. Essay
• Homosexuality and Christianity 1998. Essay
• Equations & Maxims 1998.
• Christianity and War 1997. Essay
• Stoics and Christians 1997. Essay
• Drug and Trip Reports. Regularly Updated.

Regularly Updated Pages:

• Drug and Trip Reports.
• My Photographs
• Transhumanism
• RPG
• Friends and Fellow Travellers

• Political links
• Musical links
• Painting and Photography links
• Literature, Poetry, Plays and Philosophy links
• The Life Science Initiative
• Immortality
• Safe Sex
• The Origins of Peace and Violence
• Shiatsu